mC1 wilh very little success. except to lead to the conclusion that there v•as no apparent re.ason Y<'hY it was not technically feasible. Discussions on nuclear \veapons testing. initiated in 1958, reached some agreement on test restrictions in Subsequent years.
The intervening years have been notable for the development both ·by the United States and the Soviet Union (and later by other nations) or thermonuclear wcapOns with yields up to I ,<XlO times larger than those of the weapons used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. More recently, in the SALT 1 disc-us.sions, weapons control was considered; and in SALT 11, some measure of undcrslanding on stra· tegic launch vehicles limitations was reached, resulting in the as yet unratified SALT u treaty.
The. international stockpile of nuc. lear weapons of various degrees of lclhality and yield is now common· ly referred to as 50,000 nuclear weapons. Considering the casualties and damage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused by two relatively low~yield fission weapons, the effects which would result from these weapons is beyond imagination. No satisfactory defense against nuclear weapons has been found. An attack on weapons in fixed silos or submarines in port can be made with ac.
curacy, but it seems cer~ain that a nuclear attack would be followed by a vigorous and devastating nuclear rcs-ponsc by either the United States or the Soviet Union, because of the redundancy of their relatively sur· vivable strategic systems.
The recent attack on an lraqi nuclear reactor makes it clear that potential nuclear capability by an avo\\'ed enemy has led-and can a.gain lead-to a preemptive strike. This was the first such occasion but it probably will not be the last.
We in the United St.ates arc now in the pasition or having provided the planes that made the attack on a nuclear reactor that was constructed with French help and guidance. It is a first and an unpleasant one, bolh on the score of the French invoJvement and of the Israeli attack conducted en. tireJy on the.Ir own initiative. Reportedly, the destroyed reactor had been duly inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Israelis were apparently unimpressed, claiming there was provision at the Iraqi site for separation of plutonium frorn the reactor material. • Other nations might be persuaded to join.
• Collaboration, even on a small scale as a start. might greatly decrease the probability that the United States and the Soviet Union would find themselves in confrontation with each other as a result of third· party action.
On the occasion of receiving the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, George Kennan gave a moving address on the dangers of the escalating nuclear weapQns situation. He spoke strong· range, and tactical as well as all means of their delive, ry-all I.his 10 be implemented at once and without further 'vrangling among the ex· pens, and to be subject to such na· tional means of verification as now )je at the disposal of the l"'O PO\\'Crs."
Kennan proposed further reduction,s at a later t:imc but made no mention of conditions for participation of other po,vcrs. No reference was made to the United Nations. This is a powerful proposal.
Somewhat similar ones have been rnade in desperatio1i by workers in this field before, but with no hope that anyone would take them seriously. But Kennan is very serious. This appeal goes fu rther than one that he made several years ago. He puts the propQsal entirely on a t\vo-nation basis and emphasize,s the need ror rapid movement.
One reason that such a dramatic suggestion might now be acceptable as an objective to the United States and the Soviet Union is that the nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems arc so Jarge t hat a reduction to one-half would still leave each supe.rpower with an overwhe1ming force. Although the SO percent reduction would not solve the nuclear disarmament problem it would be a start. Kennan suggests that after this initial move there should be a further reduction by two-thirds and, presumably. others to come.
Kennan's prope>sal for a 50 perce1u reduction initially is one which would shock both U.S. and Soviet military personnel, who would probably op· 4 pose it vigorously. But such a drastic reduction may not be necessary to get the prO<.'l!s.s started.
Ins tead of making a 50 percent reduction in a single move, ii "'ould perhaps be more effective lO do it in several steps. The first could be entirely bilateral. involving only the United Stales and 1hc Soviet U nion, and for a more modest 5 or IOpercent. For such a decrease it "'·ould mauer less just which weapons on each side were reduced, and therefore il shouJd be easier to come lO an agreement. The objective would be to get the reduction starred by both nations.
It " 'ould be highly desirable to have other nations ""ith nuclear armaments participating in an agreentent for weaJ>()ns reduction to some reasonable level. But making this a provis ion for starting has serious disadvantages and leads to inte-nninable delays . Provi· sion should be made, ho"·ever, towel· come other nuc1ear po,vers as adherents. Sufficiently complete nuclear di$Armament cannot be achieved wilh· out participation of a11 nuclear powers, but adherence of other na· tions should not be a condition for initiating 1he reduction.
The Kennan prop0sal seem s to gi"·e inadequate encouragement or ration· ale for other nuclear weapons states to join the superpowers. Perhaps to achieve this a further and stronger step is necessary. One proposal is fo r the United States and the Soviet Union to agree that, in addition to their own reduc1ions, they would immediately consult with each other in any situa. tion in which nuclear y,·eapons might be used or newly developed by others. They would then report the reasons for their concern to the l_ nternational Atomic Energy Agency. In this Agen· cy bolh powers have a record or participation and reasonable agreement. The degree to which the United States and the Soviet U nion would act to· gether would not be s pecified in advance.
AJong with a joint agreement to rcdu<.'(: their nuclear weapons by half, in s1agcs, there would be a basis for continued consultation and joint ac· tion. The history o f the past 20 years seems to make it reasonably unlikely that either the United States or the Soviet Union would, indepe-ndently and without nuclear action involving other nations, nlake a frontal auack on the other. The prospect of devasutting retaliation in either direct ion so far has been a strong deterrent. It is therefore very much in the interest of both nations to minimize the chance tha1 other nations would start a conflagration that might involve the United Sta tes and the Soviet Union on opposite sides.
It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union has, so far as is known publicly, been meticulous in the handling of nuclear weapons by other members of the Soviet bloc and in the processing o f spenl reactor fuel which might put other members in possession of "'ea~ pons material. Co1npared to the Soviet bloc the rest of the world is chaoLic in regard to control. Britain and France and their nuclear reactor partners, as "''Cll as Japan .
• turned down the U.S. proposal not to reprocess spent fuel until arrangements for international control or some ar· rangeme-nt for joint processing could be set up. Those nations arc going ahead with plans to separate plutonium from spen1 reactor fue1. and to use il. These recent happenings make it clear that the place to achieve some international agreement is directly with the Soviet Union.
In the past the Soviet Union has never take-0 any real action that would make it seem likely that they would look with favor either on Ken. nan's proposal or on that proposed here. Moscow agreed to SAi.. T 1 and to SALT 11 and Washington has a.greed to SALT 1 but hai; not yet ratified SA1,.T 11 although the Soviet Union has been pressing for agreement. SALT 11 does not go very far and our reticence to sign the treaty has been used cffcc~ tively by the Soviets to put us in the position of not going along with even a relatively weak control agreement.
Let us now propose specific cuts of S percent in current nuclear weapon systems-and start to make them. This would not "'ea.ken our deterrent capability appreciably. Let us then propose to the Soviet Union that they make simiJar cuts in their nuclear weapon systems. Aflcr this process is well started, the United States and the Soviet Union should begin negotiations as to ho"' further cuts could be agreed upon and made up to Kennan's SO percent as an initial goal. Let us also propose that the agenda include an exchange o f vic,vs on nuclear weapons in the hands of other nations. and that there should be an agreement to consult togelher immediately ir either nation rinds evidence or preparation ror nuclear aggression, or evidence or nuclear weapon production. in hitherto unknown programs. And further. afler the Uniled States and the Soviet Union have each made their initial step of 5 percent reduction, both should "'elcome the adherence and participation Of Other nuclear PO\.\'ers in the weapons reduction program.
Many in the United States would feel strongly that s uch a step \VOuld be wildly dangerous. But if the full SO percent reduction proposed by Kennan were taken in stages and in a "'ay to be mutually verified, the danger would decrease rather than increase. If real reduction in nuclear armaments were achieved by an agreed procedure. the tension bet,veen lhe superpowers could only decrease. Furthermore, real pressure could be brought on other nuclear powers and on potential nuclear pov1ers to pursue a similar if not identical policy.
The principal difference in this procedure compared to past suggestions is that so111e action "'·ou/d be taken early, not delayed until after discussion by a large number of nations "' ith quite different nuclear capabilhies.
Many in the United Stales would undoubtedly feel that it is a waste of time, given Russian and SO\'iet history, to pursue a course that \\'Ould depend upon their reduction of armaments. There are at least two points against this view: one is that recent Soviet military steps relating LO nuclear armament do not indicate that they see an effective means of nuclear defense. This is a new situation. It is true that they have greatly strengthened their position relative to the West in the past fe\v years and this is a policy "'e cannot overlook for long. But che.y also are vulnerable. The other paint is that, in the Eastern bloc, they have kept nuclear weap0ns control and manu fac ture to themselves. When it became clear that they could not control Chinese nuclear exploitation they immediately withdrew their supPQrt. China is a source of greater danger ror them than for us.
If we act together with the Sovie.ts in nuclear "'eapons reduction and control it would greatly complicate our evolving relations \Vith China. The Chinese have shown no interest in arms control largely because of their fear of Russia. This fear was very likely a major motivation toward more friendly relations with the Uniled States. If lhe United States and the Soviet Union agreed not only to reduce nuclear weapons but to consult and possibly act together with respect to international nuclear problems, the strongest objections would probably come from the Chinese. But, whiJe China's nuclear forces are growing, they are still very small com~ pared to those of the U nited States and the Soviet Union. Recognizing this, China might be pleased to sec nuclear weapons diminish in number.
Ed itorial especially those in So\•iet hands. Thus, China might be prepared to consider a freeze at present le\'els, leading to reduction after significant United States and Soviet reductions were made. Having an "adequate" nuclear capability in a world where stronger nuclear powers are pressing for reduclion by all is not an enviable posit.ion.
It seems best, considering the record of the past 35 years, to proceed directly \vith a proposal to the SovieL Union.
This could be couched in 1erms of a statement o f initial reductions lo be made by the United States and a proposal that the Soviet Union do likewise. Most important should be a proposal for discussions aimed at further reductions and, after this, the enlistment o r other nuclear powers to follo\v suit .
There is probably not much chance that the present pattern of negotiations established in SALT l and 11 will gel anywhere. Something different is needed. Rccen1 decisions in Europe to go ahead "'ith plutonium production and separation arc probably in part due to lack of confidence in the United States. \Ve need a ne\v policy that puts us once again in the lead in our advocacy of nuclear "'capons reduction and international control. 0 
